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In memory of our beloved colleague and friend, Dr. Tony Lewis.

FISHERIES DEVELOPMENT

US efforts to re-engage the Pacific, including through tuna fisheries, continue to unfold

In recent months, the US has made several moves and commitments to 're-engage' with the Pacific via a suite of strategic policies and relationship building efforts; tuna fisheries continue to be a key element of the broader effort.² The most directly relevant of these for the tuna sector is the Biden Administration's pledge to boost the US government contribution to the South Pacific Treaty as its 2022 expiration looms. The Administration's proposal promises an increase from the current State Department contribution of US\$ 21 million per annum to US\$60 million per annum for the next ten years from 2024 onwards. The US offered a one-up increase of US\$ 5 million under the Economic Assistance Agreement and US\$5 million for assistance with regard to climate change to allow for a continuation of negotiations. These direct signals, while still subject to the approval of the US Congress, pave the way for the detailed negotiations between the Pacific Island Parties to the Treaty and the US vessel owners over the operational matters associated with US vessel access, starting with access arrangements for 2023.³ If approved, the Treaty funds provided by the US via the State Department could be used to combat IUU fishing, support resilient and adaptive climate change and promote fisheries related economic development. It is notable, however, that after a period of expansion in vessel numbers in the US purse seine fleet, recent years have seen many vessels leave the US flag, a move attributed to higher operating costs than competitor flag states. The remaining vessels in the fleet number around thirteen, all of which predominately offload at Pago Pago to supply the Starkist cannery, which provides roughly 80 per cent of private sector employment in the US Territory.⁴

Renewed interest in the South Pacific Tuna Treaty follows from a proposal from the Western Pacific Regional Fishery Management Council for a new Pacific strategy to advance US fishery interests. The Council recommend a holistic approach that links WCPFC negotiations into a 'broader overarching goal for the United States, including geopolitical interests such as improving trade, food security, national security and ultimately, strengthened US influence in the Pacific'.⁵ In this vision, a high-level US strategy would engage tuna fisheries to offset China's growing influence in the region and to build cooperation between the US and Pacific Island countries. The Council reports developing an informational paper outlining these needs – and receiving supportive responses from the Departments of Defence, Commerce, Homeland Security, the Interior and State.⁶

Beyond fisheries, the geopolitical imperative to re-engage in the Pacific is evident in the suite of engagement strategies the US has recently launched. Following from a revamped US Indo-Pacific Strategy, the US has quickened the pace of renegotiations of expiring provisions of the Compacts of Free Association with The Federated States of Micronesia, The Republic of Marshall Islands and Palau, including by naming Joe Yun Special Envoy to the complex negotiations. President Biden has announced that he will host the first ever US-Pacific Island Country Summit, which will be held in Washington, DC in late September 2022: the aim of the summit is for the US to demonstrate its 'deep and enduring partnership with Pacific islands countries and the Pacific region'.⁷ The US has also engaged new coordination mechanisms for the Pacific's 'traditional partners' to illustrate their commitments in the region. For instance, the US, Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom are working together in a partnership called *Partners in the Blue Pacific*, collectively



CONTENTS

Fisheries Development

US efforts to re-engage the Pacific, including through tuna fisheries, continue to unfold

Fisheries Management

WCPO skipjack tuna stock remains healthy; Pacific bluefin stock is rebuilding

WCPFC holds first Science-Management Dialogue to progress harvest strategy development

IATTC makes inroads on at-sea transshipment and harvest strategies

China's third fishing moratorium on high seas fishing excludes tuna fleet

Remote surveillance tools increasingly central in combatting IUU fishing in Pacific and beyond

Labour Standards

US Trafficking in Persons Report downgrades South Korea and highlights China and PNG

EU forced labour provisions are being developed with implications for tuna trade

Tuna Industry

Nauru purse seine tuna fishery gains MSC certification

Tuna Price Trends

Multiple groups in the US are pointing to tuna fisheries as a strategic tool for US re-engagement in the Pacific



pledging USD 2.1 billion in development assistance for the region to: 'deliver results for the Pacific more effectively and efficiently, bolster Pacific regionalism, and expand opportunities for cooperation between the Pacific and the world'.⁸

FISHERIES MANAGEMENT

WCPO skipjack tuna stock remains healthy; Pacific bluefin stock is rebuilding⁹

The Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission's (WCPFC) Eighteenth Scientific Committee (SC18) was held virtually from 10-18 August 2022. During this meeting new WCPO skipjack and Pacific bluefin stock assessments were presented by the Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC).

The 2022 skipjack stock assessment indicates that according to WCPFC reference points the stock is not overfished, nor is overfishing occurring. Overall median recent spawning biomass depletion was estimated at 0.51 which is in line with the interim target reference point (TRP) of 0.50; none of the model simulations generated results below the limit reference point (LRP) of 0.20 of unfished spawning biomass. Hence, the WCPO skipjack stock is currently considered to be moderately exploited with a sustainable level of fishing mortality. Levels of fishing mortality and depletion differ between regions, with the highest impact in the tropical equatorial region (Regions 5, 6, 7 and 8 in the stock assessment model) where purse seine fishing effort is concentrated. In 2021, the total WCPO skipjack catch was estimated to be 1.54 million mt, a 10% decrease from 2020 and markedly below the highest catch on record of around 2 million mt in 2019. Purse seine catch accounted for 81% of total catch in 2021 (1.25 million mt), with similar impacts by associated (i.e. FAD, log sets) and unassociated (i.e. free-school) sets in three out of four of the equatorial regions in the model.

The 2022 Pacific bluefin stock assessment indicates that the spawning stock biomass has gradually increased in the last ten years, with the rate of increase accelerating. These biomass increases coincide with a decline in fishing mortality due to stringent stock rebuilding management measures put in place in 2014 after the Pacific bluefin stock reached a historically low level in 2010 due to overfishing. The 2022 assessment indicated that stock recovery is occurring at a faster rate than anticipated; spawning stock biomass has exceeded the initial rebuilding target five years earlier than expected; and it is probable that the second rebuilding target (20% of unfished spawning biomass) will be achieved by 2029. Hence, the projection shows that increases in catches are possible without affecting the meeting of the second rebuilding target. However, SC18 recommended that the Commission exercise a precautionary approach when considering any revisions to the current conservation and management measure given the Pacific bluefin stock still remains in an overfished state (10.2% of unfished spawning biomass) and remains below the LRP set by WCPFC and IATTC for other tuna species (20% of unfished spawning biomass), in lieu of an LRP being set for North Pacific albacore as yet. Consideration of any increases to the catch limit needs to be weighed against reducing the probability of reaching the second rebuilding target.

*The WCPO
skipjack stock is
currently fished
at sustainable
levels*

*The WCPO
Pacific bluefin
stock has
exceeded the
first rebuilding
target five years
earlier than
expected*

WCPFC holds first Science-Management Dialogue to progress harvest strategy development¹⁰

On 19 and 22 August 2022, WCPFC held its first Science-Management Dialogue (SMD01) virtually. The establishment of this group was initially tabled at WCPFC15 in 2018, with the intention of providing a dedicated forum for fisheries managers and scientists to expedite the development of harvest strategies for WCPO's four key tuna stocks in line with the Commission's Indicative Workplan for the Adoption of Harvest Strategies Under CMM 2014-06.

Harvest strategies (also known as management procedures) are pre-agreed management actions developed to achieve ecological, economic and/or social objectives for a fishery/stock. While considered best practice for modern fisheries management, harvest strategies are highly technical in nature and require clear understanding on the part of fisheries managers to ensure full participation in their development. Hence, one of the primary objectives of SMD01 was to bridge the gap between science and fisheries management to achieve consistent understanding amongst WCPFC members on the structure, function and implementation of the harvest strategy approach for WCPO tuna stocks. According to WCPFC's Executive Director, Mr. Feleti Teo, the Science-Management Dialogue 'presented an opportunity for scientists and managers to come together and to exchange views and to query each other on the implications of the scientific advice and information provided by the scientists, so that the fisheries managers and policy makers are better informed and better equipped to decide on the appropriate management decisions'.

WCPFC's Indicative Harvest Strategy Workplan (2021 update) tasks the Commission with adopting management procedures for WCPO skipjack and South Pacific albacore in 2022. Hence, SMD01 initiated discussions on prioritising management procedures for these two stocks for consideration by WCPFC19 and identified further analytical work required in the lead up to the December meeting. At the conclusion of SMD01, members agreed that it is on track for adoption at WCPFC19 due to sufficient progress made on the management procedure for skipjack. However, technical work on other stocks, including South Pacific albacore has been delayed, requiring the need for milestones in the WCPFC's Harvest Strategy Workplan to be updated at WCPFC19.

While the value and merits of SMD01 were noted, views differed amongst members on the future process. Given SMD01 was held on a trial basis in accordance with WCPFC18's decision, the Commission will now need to decide on whether or not a Science-Management Dialogue should be scheduled again in future and, if so, when and whether it should be formalized.

IATTC makes inroads on at-sea transshipment and harvest strategies

The 100th Annual Meeting of the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC) was held in-person in Phoenix, Arizona, from 1-5 August 2022. Two resolutions were adopted during this meeting which have some potential bearing on developments within WCPFC.

Following in the footsteps of two other regional fisheries management organisations (RFMOs), the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT) and the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC), IATTC reached agreement on the adoption of strengthened measures for monitoring at-sea transshipment conducted by large-scale longline vessels (at-sea transshipment is prohibited for

WCPFC is on track to adopt a management procedure for WCPO skipjack in December 2022

other gear types). Loopholes in data collection requirements which facilitated catch misreporting have been addressed through new detailed reporting requirements which allow for the cross-checking of electronic transshipment notifications and declarations from fishing and carrier vessels.¹¹ The new measure also introduces an IMO number reporting requirement for carriers, shortened reporting deadlines and a requirement for all carrier vessels regardless of size to carry vessel monitoring systems (VMS), bringing IATTC's at-sea transshipment monitoring more in line with best practice.

It is likely that WCPFC will follow suit from IATTC (and other RFMOs) on strengthened at sea transshipment requirements. The new measure (Resolution C-22-03) explicitly notes the need for better transshipment information-sharing protocols between IATTC and WCPFC and the need for a harmonized approach towards managing the IATTC/WCPFC overlap area. IATTC's Secretariat is also tasked with coordinating with WCPFC observer programme coordinators to encourage increased cooperation between carrier observer programs.¹²

ICCAT also reached agreement on a harvest strategy (management procedure) for North Pacific Albacore. The harvest strategy establishes quantitative management objectives for the stock; limit, threshold and target reference points; acceptable levels of risk for not breaching the limit reference point; and a monitoring strategy. IATTC members were unable to reach agreement on the implementation of harvest control rules during this meeting, but have agreed to their adoption as part of the harvest strategy in 2023; the harvest control rules are intended to include the triggering of a rebuilding plan if the spawning stock biomass falls below the limit reference point (i.e. 14% of unfished spawning biomass). IATTC intends to promote compatibility of this harvest strategy, starting with the definition of reference points, with any future North Pacific albacore harvest strategy adopted in WCPFC. This is in line with the Antigua Convention, which requires highly migratory stocks to be managed throughout their entire range; the North Pacific albacore stock spans the entire Pacific Ocean north of the equator. The WCPFC Convention also mandates cooperation with IATTC regarding fish stocks that occur in the convention areas of both RFMOs.¹³

Ahead of the meeting, NGOs, notably the International Seafood Sustainability Foundation (ISSF) and Global Tuna Alliance (GTA), called for action on tropical tuna management, FAD management, harvest strategies, at-sea transshipment, observer coverage and electronic monitoring, by-catch and shark management, compliance monitoring and capacity management. However, agreement could not be reached by IATTC members on a number of proposals covering some of these issues.¹⁴

China's third fishing moratorium on high seas fishing excludes tuna fleet

China's Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs has implemented unilateral fishing moratoriums in some high seas areas for two consecutive years since 2020. On 23 May 2022, it announced a policy banning Chinese-flagged vessels from fishing on high seas areas for certain periods. The focus is on fleets targeting species that are not yet managed by regional fisheries management organizations, with the tuna purse seine and longline fleets as the main exclusions.¹⁵

The moratorium covers around 1,500 vessels engaged in squid fishing, trawling and light purse seining and applies to portions of the Southwest Atlantic Ocean and the northern Indian Ocean between July and end-September, and the Eastern Pacific Ocean from September to end-November.¹⁶

*ICCAT's
new at sea
transshipment
measure
better reflects
best practice
monitoring*

*ICCAT will
promote
compatibility
of its North
Pacific Albacore
harvest strategy
with WCPFC*

It is not known whether these unilateral moratoria contribute in any way to the recovery of fish populations in high seas areas. But, it does indicate some growing sensitivity of the Chinese state to high seas fisheries governance. This perhaps represents an ongoing area of cooperation between China and the Pacific Islands in tuna governance.

Remote surveillance tools increasingly central in combatting IUU fishing in Pacific and beyond

Illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing remains a top concern in fisheries management globally, and growth in satellite and remote surveillance capacity and strategies in recent years are now a key strategy that is positioned to combat the practice. As the development and use of such tools advances, Pacific Island countries have taken leading roles in its use, first through the FFA Regional Fisheries Surveillance Center, and now through a range of other national and regional projects. Two recent projects in this vein illustrate the potential, and the multi-sectoral collaborations that are emerging to make remote IUU surveillance a reality.

A recent initiative in Tuvalu is funded by the World Bank's longstanding PROP project (Pacific Islands Regional Oceanscape Program) and utilizes a New Zealand firm – Starboard Maritime Intelligence – with an aim of charging the extent of fishing activity by non-authorized or non-reporting vessels. Starboard Maritime relies on commercial vessel-detection satellites, which are rapidly proliferating as a data source. Moving beyond a reliance on AIS data alone, Starboard Maritime utilizes an approach called synthetic aperture radar to scan the oceans and map locations of navigational radars aboard ships. The innovation is that vessels detected through this method that are not also reporting locations using the mandated identification systems can be identified as 'dark' and potentially evading requirements. FFA and the New Zealand Defence Force provide additional monitoring and verification and the overall programme also offers training to local authorities in Tuvalu.¹⁷

Similarly, a network of organisations has developed to launch the 'Joint Analytical Cell' (JAC), an initiative to increase data sharing and collaboration among governments and non-state actors to fight IUU.¹⁸ The JAC is founded by the International Monitoring, Control, and Surveillance Network (IMCS – intergovernmental organization funded by the US Agency for International Development), Global Fishing Watch (non-profit based in the US) and TMT (non-profit based in Norway). The premise of the JAC is that new data collection and analytics methods are enabling extensive monitoring of fishing activities, but that international cooperation – and organisations to facilitate this cooperation – is required to enable countries to access and act upon information. As such data sources and collaborations continue to unfold, further work is needed to elaborate and develop mechanisms for linking data and analytics on vessel location to enforcement of existing regulations.

LABOUR STANDARDS

US Trafficking in Persons Report downgrades South Korea and highlights China and PNG

Every year the US State Department publishes its *Trafficking in Persons Report (TIP)*; a detailed survey of evidence and analysis on forced labour and human trafficking. It is important to the tuna industry because countries involved in tuna fisheries are often highlighted because of abuses of crew. The *TIP* ranks countries according to four categories: Tier 1 nations meet minimum standards as based upon several UN

China pulls the plug on squid and other high seas fleets between July and November

New technologies and partnerships are enabling detailed monitoring of fishing vessels

and International Labour Organisation conventions; Tier 2 are making significant efforts to meet the standards; Tier 2 'Watch List' countries are seen as requiring special scrutiny; and Tier 3 countries are deemed to not be making significant efforts to meet the minimum standards.¹⁹

Among the most important changes in the *TIP* 2022 rankings in the context of the global tuna industry is the downgrading of South Korea from Tier 1 to Tier 2. The State Department emphasises that, despite many reports of trafficking among migrant workers in Korea 'especially in Korea's fishing fleet', the government has not reported any cases of foreign forced labour.

The State Department calls on South Korea to push its work to investigate, prosecute, and convict traffickers and 'those who use forced labour on South Korean-flagged fishing vessels'. It also recommends the 'enforcement of protections for migrant fishermen, including by enforcing prohibitions against document confiscation, and develop a more consistent and effective system for inspecting the labour conditions of fishing vessels'.²⁰

The South Korean Government taken some action, including Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries training seafarers' labour inspectors to identify trafficking. In order to close gaps in Korean labour law that failed to cover foreign crew, rules were issued in January 2021 to better regulate the recruitment system, prevent excessive working hours, set a minimum salary and ensure the provision of clean drinking water for migrant seafarers. However, NGOs continue to raise concerns that these rules are not adequately implemented.²¹

South Korea's major competitors – China and Taiwan – are ranked in Tier 1 and Tier 3 respectively. Taiwan continues to be ranked in Tier 1, even if cases of suspected forced labour in Taiwan's DWF persist. As such, the *TIP* calls on Taiwan to increase inspections and, where appropriate, prosecute the senior crew and owners of Taiwan-flagged, as well as Taiwan-owned, foreign-flagged fishing vessels.²²

In contrast, China continues to be in Tier 3. The State Department highlights a number of fisheries specific dimensions for this ranking, including:

- A lack of any reporting of 'measures to screen for, or identify, forced labour indicators among the thousands of vulnerable migrant seafarers employed on PRC [Peoples' Republic of China] national-owned DWF vessels';
- Crew from Africa, Asia (especially Indonesia and the Philippines), and other regions employed on 'many of the 2,900 PRC-flagged DWF fishing vessels operating worldwide experience contract discrepancies, excessive working hours, degrading living conditions, severe verbal and physical abuse, denial of access to healthcare, restricted communication, document retention, arbitrary garnishing or non-payment of wages, and other forced labour indicators, often while being forced to remain at sea for months or years at a time'. This does not include China-owned, foreign flagged vessels.

The State Department asks for increased oversight of labour conditions in China's fishing industry such as 'banning illegal and unregistered recruitment agencies; mandating international vessel registration; collecting and publishing information on vessel licensure, registered operating areas, and crew manifests; conducting random onboard inspections; and working with port country authorities to investigate and criminally prosecute distant water fleet (DWF) forced labour crimes.'

S. Korea drops to Tier 2 due to failure to report forced migrant labour in its distant water fleet

China fails to report measures to fight forced labour on its distant water fleet, despite widespread, serious reports of abuses

A number of Pacific Islands are currently in the Tier 2 Watch List, including Palau, Papua New Guinea and Tonga, which means that they are deemed by the TIP to be making significant efforts to bring themselves into compliance, *but* that the estimated number of victims of severe forms of trafficking is very significant or is significantly increasing, and the country is not taking proportional concrete actions; or there is a failure to provide evidence of increasing efforts to combat severe forms of trafficking. From a fisheries perspective, PNG in particular is highlighted by the report, including:

- 'Endemic corruption and complicity among officials, particularly in the logging and fishing sectors, continued to facilitate vulnerability to sex trafficking and forced labor among foreign and local populations.'
- Southeast Asian and PNG crew seeking work on fishing vessels go into debt to pay recruitment fees, 'which vessel owners and senior crew manipulate to coerce them to continue working indefinitely through debt bondage in Papua New Guinea's exclusive economic zone and in other maritime territories, *particularly in tuna fishing*'.
- Fishing crew 'may face little to no pay, contract switching, wage garnishing or withholding, harsh working and living conditions, restricted communication, and threats of physical violence as coercive tactics to retain their labor.'²³

Fiji, FSM, Marshall Islands, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu are on Tier 2, which means that they are deemed to be making significant efforts to bring themselves into compliance.

EU forced labour provisions are being developed with implications for tuna trade

The elimination of forced labour by 2030 is the target of Sustainable Development Goal 8.7, yet the International Labour Organisation estimates that 27.6 million people are in a condition of forced labour globally.²⁴ The global tuna fishing industry is known to be of the problem areas, especially forced labour among crew (see the story above on the US Trafficking in Persons Report). However, the EU's target is more generally focussed on China, including the millions of indigenous Uyghur and Kazakh citizens from the Uyghur Region who have been placed into forms of forced labour to produce solar panels.²⁵

In this context, the European Commission in September 2022 proposed a new regulation that will seek to effectively prohibit the sale on the EU market of products made with forced labour. This comes on the heels of a February proposal for an EU Directive on corporate sustainability due diligence, which is wider ranging but only targets larger companies.²⁶ In practice, the proposed forced labour instrument will:

- Make illegal all products made with forced labour, banning their sale in the EU or as exports, regardless of whether they were made in the EU or elsewhere (i.e. the rule will not discriminate and is thus designed to be WTO compatible).
- National authorities in EU Member States will implement the rule and carry out investigations based on information provided by both the EU and civil society organizations.

PNG is in the Tier 2 Watch List for debt bondage in the tuna fleet in the EEZ, alleged corruption in relation to forced labour, and labour abuses

The growing range of public social standards are likely to be used to raise the costs of labour in EU competitors

- In cases of forced labour, EU customs authorities will intervene, withdrawing products from the market, and companies would then be required to dispose of the goods.
- Empower member-states to penalize non-compliant companies and include a non-cooperation clause permitting EU authorities to take decisions based on 'best available' facts should companies and non-EU countries refuse to cooperate.²⁷

Combined with wide ranging US actions on forced labour, this emerging set of EU policies governing supply chains will place ever-increasing scrutiny on labour standards and working conditions, including in the global tuna industry. While it has primarily been fishing crew in the spotlight in recent years, it is likely that working conditions in other parts of the supply chain such as processing will be highlighted, including by EU industry which faces a higher cost structure due to wage and other labour standards and so is keen to identify 'unfair' competition from developing country competitors.

TUNA INDUSTRY

Nauru purse seine tuna fishery gains MSC certification

The Nauru tuna purse seine fishery achieved Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) certification in early July 2022. The fishery entered MSC full assessment in March 2021, with the certification jointly held by the Nauru Fisheries and Marine Resources Authority (NFMRA) and FCF, the Taiwanese parent company of Bumble Bee Foods LLC. According to a news report, the certification is jointly held by NFMRA and FCF with 'facilitation and technical support' provided by FCF. The first MSC surveillance audit is scheduled for June 2023.²⁸

The certification granted by MSC and cited in the Public Certification Report²⁹ is for fishing in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean by 20 Nauru-flagged purse seine vessels. These 20 vessels represent all but one of the tuna purse seiners registered in Nauru. Eighteen of the 20 vessels are believed to be affiliated with Taiwan owners and two with Korean owners. Of the 18 Taiwan-affiliated vessels, ten were previously registered in PNG and eight were registered in the USA and operated under the tuna treaty between the Pacific Island countries and the US. Of the 20 Nauru-flagged vessels, three are operating under charter the Kiribati company Kiritimati Island Fish Ltd.³⁰

The 20 Nauru vessels currently covered by the certification are said to have a hold capacity ranging from 1,099 to 2,386 mt, with a combined reported catch in 2020 of 87,703 mt consisting of 84.4% skipjack, 13.6% yellowfin, and 2% bigeye in 2020. According to FCF, the vessels operating in the certified fishery are expected to result in an MSC-eligible catch of 130,000 mt.³¹

The geographic scope of fishing area for the vessels covered by the certificate includes the Effort Limit Area for Purse Seine (ELAPS), comprised of the high seas between 20 degrees North and 20 degrees South in the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC) convention area, as well as the EEZs of other PNA member countries.³²

Nauru's MSC certification covers 18 Taiwanese and two Korean-beneficially owned purse seine vessels



The MSC Public Certification Report³³ notes that some vessels may 'move out and in of the client group which will be considered as long as they share the same characteristics (fishing gear/operations, management system, and area of operation) and are therefore eligible vessels'.³⁴ In such a case(s) MSC will conduct 'a gap analysis' to confirm that various characteristics are the same for the existing fishery certificate and are within the scope of the MSC Fisheries Standard (i.e. verify that no vessels have been convicted of shark finning violation or conviction for forced or child labour in the last two years).


The MSC certification for purse seiners registered in Nauru is the latest wrinkle in the development of Nauru's tuna fishery. In the early 1980s, the Nauru Fishing Corporation was established by the government, with two 948 ton purse seiners purchased from Peru. The *Austin Bernicke* and *Victor Eoaeo* were initially operated with Peruvian, and later Philippine, captains and crew, but were not operationally or financially successful. In January 1986, while at anchor at Nauru with a caretaker crew, the *Victor Eoaeo's* moorings parted in heavy weather and the vessel hit the reef and sank. All of the crew were rescued, but the vessel was not salvageable³⁵. Around that time the *Austin Bernicke* was sent to drydock in the Philippines where it was later sold after a long period of inactivity.

As evidenced by the current activities described above, rather than own and operate its own vessels, Nauru has chosen a different path to better develop its tuna fishery. A major component of that development is the construction of expanded port facilities funded by the Asian Development Bank and others estimated to cost in excess of USD 80 million. The inclusion of facilities for unloading and transshipping of tuna and providing a logistics base for fishing vessels is part of the overall plan to construct what is described as 'a climate resilient international port to increase trade opportunities and facilitate economic growth'.³⁶ According to the NFMRA's CEO Charleston Deiye, the landing of fish at the new port for transshipment and local processing is one of the major drivers in the creation of a Nauru-flagged purse seine fleet.³⁷


Nauru views fleet expansion as part of an overall domestic development strategy

TUNA PRICE TRENDS³⁸


Bangkok canning-grade prices to August 2022³⁹




Japan frozen sashimi prices (ex-vessel, Japanese ports) to July 2022⁴⁰




Japan fresh sashimi prices (origin Oceania) to July 2022⁴¹



US imported fresh sashimi prices to July 2022⁴²



Crude oil, canning-grade frozen skipjack (SKJ) and frozen bigeye (BET) price index to August 2022⁴³



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² 'US must address Pacific Island priorities to get onside – expert', *Radio New Zealand*, 15 July 2022. Available at: <http://www.rnz.co.nz>

³ 'FFA welcomes US announcement of significant increase to financial contribution under Multilateral Tuna Treaty with Pacific Island countries', *FFA Press Release*, 13 July 2022. Available at: <https://www.ffa.int>

⁴ For further discussion see, e.g., 'Testimony of James Sousa, President, American Tunaboat Association, Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee', 6 April 2022. Available at: https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/040622_Sousa_Testimony1.pdf

⁵ Western Pacific Regional Fishery Management Council 2022. 'Council proposes a new Pacific strategy to advance US interests through fisheries', *Pacific Islands Fishery News*, Spring. Available at: https://issuu.com/wpcouncil/docs/pifn_spring_2022_web/s/16261073

⁶ Nick Sambides Jr. 'US pushes 'tuna politics' with 10-year \$600m pledge to Pacific islands', *Undercurrent News*, 15 July 2022. Available at: <https://www.undercurrentnews.com>

⁷ 'Statement by Press Secretary Karine Jean-Pierre on the First US-Pacific Island Country Summit', *Briefing Room Statements and Releases*, 2 September 2022. Available at: <https://www.whitehouse.gov/>

⁸ 'Statement by Australia, Japan, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States on the establishment of the Partners in the Blue Pacific (PBP)', *Briefing Room Statements and Releases*, 24 June 2022. Available at: <https://www.whitehouse.gov/>

⁹ WCPFC 2022, *Eighteenth Regular Session of the Scientific Committee (SC18) – Outcomes Document*, 29 August 2022. Available at: <https://www.wcpfc.int>

¹⁰ WCPFC 2022, *Commission Science-Management Dialogue First Meeting – Draft Summary Report (WCPFC19-2022-SMD01)*, 5 September. Available at: <https://www.wcpfc.int>

¹¹ Chris Loew 2022, 'IATTC meeting closes with agreements on transshipment and monitoring', *Seafood Source*, 8 August. Available at: <https://www.seafoodsource.com>

¹² IATTC Resolution C-22-03: Amendment to Resolution C-12-07 on establishing a program for transshipments by large-scale fishing vessels. Available at: <https://www.iatcc.org>

¹³ IATTC Resolution C-22-04: Harvest Strategy for North Pacific Albacore in the Eastern Pacific Ocean. Available at: <https://www.iatcc.org>

¹⁴ Refer to IATTC website for various NGO position statements to 100th Meeting of ICCAT: <https://www.iatcc.org/en-US/Event/DetailMeeting/Meeting-IATTC-100>

¹⁵ The full text is available in Chinese [using Google translate]: Fisheries and Fisheries Administration, Notice of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs on the implementation of the voluntary fishing moratorium on the high seas in 2022, May 23, 2022: http://www.moa.gov.cn/govpublic/YJ/202205/t20220525_6400465.htm. See also: 'Notice on the Implementation of the 2022 voluntary fishing moratorium on the high seas': <https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/6G2e10tCVS9E3ElmfVZJMQ>

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