FFA Trade News June 2009

Volume 2: Issue 6        June 2009

This issue includes articles on the PNA, onshore processing investments in PICS, Mexico-US tuna dolphin issues and trade, labour rights, the impact of piracy on Western Indian Ocean tuna fisheries and exporting tuna to China.








Volume 2: Issue 6        June 2009

By Elizabeth Havice and Liam Campling[1]


PNA countries demand sustainability and higher access returns from tuna fisheries
Onshore processing investments in PICs: Assessing the net benefits?

Mexico-US tuna-dolphin debate returns
Labour rights and the global fish trade

The continuing impact of piracy on Western Indian Ocean tuna fisheries
Exporting tuna to China


PNA countries demand sustainability and higher access returns from tuna fisheries

The PNA (the Parties to the Nauru Agreement) countries, a group of Pacific island countries that control a large portion of the worldís richest tuna fisheries, have begun to take action to win a bigger share of the US$3 billion tuna industry. Historically, the island states earn less than 5 percent of the value of the tuna caught in the region, most of which is taken within their exclusive economic zones.[2]

The PNA countriesí partnership forges a joint approach to fisheries management to overcome the divide-and-conquer tactics that distant water fleets allegedly use to keep access fees low. The PNA countriesí primary goals are to address overfishing of yellowfin and bigeye tuna, improve licensing revenue and to more fully integrate themselves into the tuna production chain through joint-venture fishing efforts[3] and onshore, tuna-related investments (see below).

To achieve these goals, the PNA countries have taken several actions. They have agreed to increase data collection about discards and Fish Aggregating Devices and they are working to implement increased observer coverage requirements. In cooperation with non-PNA PICs, they successfully lobbied the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC) for a 30 percent reduction in bigeye tuna fishing mortality over three years.[4] They also successfully closed two pockets of international waters (known as donut holes) between their EEZs; no fishing will take place in these regions where, in the past, distant water fleets often fished to avoid access fees. PNA countries have agreed to continue to support existing high seas pockets closures at the next WCPFC meeting, and to seek the closure of two additional high seas pocket areas.[5]

PNA countries are clarifying the terms of the newly implemented Vessel Day Scheme to ensure that it increases the economic return from licensing while managing fishing effort. PNA countries are discussing potential applications ñ such as a vessel days trading stock exchange mechanism ñ for the Parties to trade days amongst themselves. The Parties are also exploring commercial arrangements between PNA countries and major tuna processors[6] and negotiating the total allowable effort for coming management years.[7] Each of these efforts is designed to reduce the control that tuna operators have over the fishery, and shift it into the hands of the PNA countries.

To facilitate these efforts, the PNA countries have announced that they will set up their own secretariat in the Marshall Islands; a move that is fuelling debate over the implications of a ëtuna cartelí capable of controlling tuna supplies and prices.[8] FFA has historically provided the PNA group with legal and technical assistance that enables PNA countries to meet and make decisions. The PNA countries emphasise that the establishment of the PNA Secretariat is not an effort to break up the FFA, but rather an effort by the PNA to fully establish itself.[9] The Papua New Guinea government has committed USD 1 million to develop the Secretariat.[10]

Onshore processing investments in PICs: Assessing the net benefits?

One of the ways PICs seek to increase their returns from tuna is by creating incentives for the establishment of onshore investments, such as tuna processing facilities. The logic behind the effort is that onshore investments provide jobs and create ëspin-offí economic benefits such as investments in port and transportation infrastructure and new businesses related to the tuna processing investments.

Using this rationale, several PICs have secured onshore processing facilities in their countries, often by promising valuable fishing licenses in exchange for onshore investments. As a result, several new processing projects are also in various stages of development. Foreign investors are scouting new projects sites in Malaita and in the Foumamanu area in East Kwaraíae, Solomon Islands.[11] A new plant in Vanuatu began delivering sashimi to Japan in April 2009.[12] In the Marshall Islands, Shanghai Deep Seas Fishing Company has renovated and re-opened the former PM&O tuna loining plant (now operating as Pan Pacific Foods (RMI) Ltd.) In PNG, two global canning giants, Thai Union and Century Tuna, have teamed with Frabelle (a Filipino firm currently running a processing plant in PNG) to invest in a new plant in Lae.[13] In January 2009, government and industry broke ground on the Pacific Marine Industrial Zone (PMIZ) in PNG. The PMIZ will be an industrial park that localises businesses ñ such as net repair companies and dry-dock facilities ñ necessary to support canning operations and create jobs. The PMIZ is designed to improve the regional efficiency of tuna fishing and processing operations, to the benefit of all PICs.[14]

These investments are an important sign of tuna-related economic development of the kind most desired by PIC governments. However, there have been some concerns expressed that PICs have secured onshore investments (by offering incentives to make such investments feasible) without fully assessing the net benefits of the projects relative to the stresses that they stand to place on tuna resources and local communities and environments. There is concern that governments are granting fishing licenses based on promised facilities that might never materialise to the extent promised and that plans do not include comprehensive analyses of resource sustainability or the net socio-economic returns that the plants will gather.[15]

Furthermore, unexpected conflicts between communities and the processing facilities have arisen at several production sites, including, for example, disputes over working conditions, land rights and pollution.[16] Such conflicts not only have the potential to negatively impact the long term success of the investments, but also call into question the overall net benefits of onshore investment without ensuring socio-economic ëreturnsí.

As the push for onshore investment in exchange for fishing rights continues, PICs need to fully assess the net benefits of such projects. This includes: developing a methodology for avoiding overcapacity in the fishing sector, developing accountability measures for investors to ensure that facilities deliver promised benefits, assessing levels of benefits to processing facility workers (often one of the main direct benefits), calculating net foreign exchange benefits, assessing how such developments will impact local communities, and developing mechanisms to avoid and mitigate conflicts before they arise. Such steps will greatly increase the net benefits of onshore investments for PICs.


Mexico-US tuna-dolphin debate returns

In yet another twist in the long-standing tuna-dolphin debate between the US and Mexico, the World Trade Organisationís (WTO) Dispute Settlement Body established a panel to hear Mexicoís complaint against US rules on ëdolphin-safeí labeled tuna.[17] Mexico claims that the criteria for the dolphin safe logo, which is administered by the US Department of Commerce, discriminates against its tuna exports.

Mexicoís tuna purse seine fleet is active in the Eastern Pacific, where tuna and dolphin school together. When the fleet captures tuna, dolphin are often killed as incidental bycatch. (Tuna and dolphin do not school together in the Western and Central Pacific, so this bycatch is not a problem in the region.) As a result, according to the US Department of Commerce, Mexicoís tuna do not meet the US dolphin-safe criteria and are thus not eligible to bear the ëdolphin-safeí label. Failure to secure the label has serious consequences for Mexican products: most retailers and tuna processors shun non-certified fish because of consumer pressure for the label. The Mexican government indicates that failure to secure the label (and thus, access to the US market) has caused the country to lose one third of its tuna fleet. This must also be set in the context of preferential tariff treatment for Mexican canned product into the US under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).

Mexico argues that its exports should be entitled to the label since its fishing practices comply with the guidelines accepted by the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC), which sets annual dolphin mortality caps and requires vessels to carry on-board observers. Both Mexico and the US are members of IATTC. The US argues that the case should be arbitrated under NAFTA, rather than at the WTO, since NAFTA members agreed (under Article 2005 (4)) that cases concerning the protection of the environment, or the health of animals or plant life, would be heard (at the responding partyís option), solely under NAFTAís dispute settlement procedures.

Despite the US argument, the WTO established a dispute settlement panel in April 2009. The case marks the first time that a panel will examine the WTO compatibility of voluntary product labeling, although one administered by a government. The results stand to have important influence on the to-date inconclusive ñ and heated ñ debate on whether private standards (including eco-labels for fish products) are barriers to market access. This debate is housed at the WTOís Committee on Sanitary and PhytoSanitary Measures.

The tuna-dolphin debate was first heard by the WTOís predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). In the 1991 GATT panel report, the GATT condemned the US import embargo of tuna caught in association with dolphins, but it ruled that requiring tuna products to be labeled ëdolphin-safeí did not violate GATT rules because the measure was designed to prevent deceptive advertising for all tuna products, whether imported or domestically produced. As a result, this latest tuna tiff will set an important precedent at the WTO.

Labour and the global fish trade

Mayís issue of Fisheries Trade News noted that the role and treatment of workersí in the tuna industry is a heavy silence in most discussions of the sector, including at industry conferences and in terms of consumer labelling.[18] This oversight is of particular importance to PICs because one of the main direct benefits from foreign investment in onshore processing facilities is employment generation, not least because firms are generally given significant tax breaks or tax holidays thereby reducing government revenue generation, such as in export processing ñ or ëfree tradeí ñzones (EPZs). While many countries around the world maintain minimum wage legislation, this is not always set sufficiently high to maintain a basic standard of living. For example, Pacific island workers often have to rely on other sources of livelihoods ñ such as small-scale agriculture ñ to top-up incomes. In addition, companies investing in processing in developing countries are often attracted by a lack of labour laws (e.g. in EPZs), the lack of political will to enforce them where they exist, or otherwise lax implementation.

A recent documentary aired on UK national television highlighted concerns around workersí living standards in the canned tuna industry in Indonesia.[19] This documentary had young British adults spend a day working on the production line in a cannery and a day working with fishers on a pole and line vessel. Their experiences were invariably humbling and the documentary raised questions around the ëfairnessí of the incomes and working conditions of people that produce canned tuna for export to developed countries.  It is unlikely that this documentary will initiate a move to support heightened regulation or voluntary labelling of labour standards in the marketing of seafood ñ like ëfair tradeí tea, coffee, cotton, fruit, cut flowers, etc, has done, albeit for niche levels of consumption. (The Fairtrade movement ñ and associate product labelling ñ focuses on better prices, decent working conditions, local sustainability, and fair terms of trade for farmers and workers in the developing world.[20])

Exporters selling to some developed country retailers often have to meet certain basic ethical standards imposed by supermarkets (under pressure from trade unions and NGOs), such as the UKís Ethical Trading Initiative or compulsory social accounting standards in Scandinavia.[21]  These ethical standards often include a commitment to not use forced or bonded or child labour; workers must have the right to freely form trade unions; and, safe and hygienic working conditions must be in place, but these requirements are generally far less extensive than those required by Fairtrade labelling.

The International Labour Organisation (ILO) has set an increasingly wide range of labour standards since its creation in 1919 as a ëtripartiteí arrangement (one-third equal representation by states, companies and trade unions). This includes a set of standards developed to cover the specificities of the fisheries sector, such as the most recent 2007 Work in Fishing Convention, as well as more general Conventions covering the rights of workers, including women and migrant and child labour.[22] The 2007 Work in Fishing Convention superseded several older Conventions relating to fishers. Its objective is to promote ëdecent conditions of work on board fishing vesselsí, access to necessary ëaccommodation and food; occupational safety and health protection; [and] medical care and social securityí.

Another source of support for the rights of fishers is the International Transport Workers' Federation (ITWF) which represents seafarers, including fishing crews on large scale vessels. It plays an active monitoring and lobbying role. The ITWFís work includes representing seafarers in the ILO, it campaigns on the eradication both of flags of convenience (FOC) and of illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing, as well as on the organisation of currently unorganised fishers.[23] The International Collective in Support of Fishworkers (ICSF) also undertakes lobbying and advocacy on behalf of people working in fisheries, primarily in the artisanal and small-scale sector, where it actively engages with ILO processes.[24] It publishes the important triannual journal Samdura, occasional papers, proceedings, and reports which are available for free download here: http://www.icsf.net

Sustainable seafood labelling schemes such as those provided by the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) or Friend of the Sea focus primarily on environmental considerations. While Friend of the Sea recently revised its criteria to include basic socio-economic requirements, the MSC continues to fail to recognise this aspect of ësustainabilityí. Despite very minor media coverage of developing country fish workers in the British media, far deeper pressure will have to be put on to ensure that seafood labelling schemes incorporate full criteria on the ësustainabilityí of workersí livelihoods involved in the catching and processing of fish. It remains to be seen whether governments, labelling initiatives and/or consumers will push the global tuna industry to ensure that its workers are guaranteed to receive fair treatment and pay. Fisheries Trade News will be continuing to run stories on this issue.


The continuing impact of piracy on Western Indian Ocean tuna fisheries

Piracy in the Western Indian Ocean has intensified in recent months, affecting commercial activities in the region, including tuna fishing. The piratesí main objective is to make money, primarily through demanding ransom for the return of crew, vessels and cargo.[25] Allegedly, the pirates initially targeted vessels fishing illegally or dumping toxic waste into the seas; but targets have become far more widespread.[26]

In the early months of 2009, the pirates began moving from the Somali coastline towards the tuna-rich waters surrounding the Seychelles. Tuna vessels operating in this region have become targets and are vulnerable to attack on account that they are often isolated from other vessels, are generally unarmed, and are immobilised while the nets are set, generally for two to three hours at a time. The vessels themselves are low on water and easy to access, carrying between 20 and 25 crew/hostages.[27] The large longline tuna vessels are also targeted for use as ëmothershipsí for the piratesí speedboats.[28] By April 2009, there had been five attempted attacks on EU purse seiners, one of which was successful, and the capture of a Taiwanese longline vessel.[29]

The implications for the tuna industry have been widespread and cascading. First, as piracy attacks have moved into key tuna fishing grounds, tuna fishing efforts and catch have declined dramatically. The EU fleet, for example, has been reduced to 50 vessels, down 20 percent in the last two years; a decline attributed to the threat of piracy,[30] but also certainly influenced by low catch rates in the sub-region and higher catches in the Eastern Atlantic (the location to which several vessels have shifted their fishing efforts). The Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC) has indicated that piracy contributed to a 30 percent reduction in catch in 2008, as compared with 2007.[31] Distant water fishing nations have deployed naval envoys to protect their merchant and fishing vessels, but the resources are not sufficient to protect all interests. For those captive vessels operating illegally or under flags of convenience, there have been disputes over which naval efforts are responsible for their rescue (and who should pay ransoms).[32]

The Taiwanese fishing association had an internal debate over whether they should begin arming their crews in order to better protect themselves. The industry association rejected such a proposal, suggesting that instead, fishing vessels should avoid areas frequented by pirates, confrontation and close contact with ships of uncertain origin.[33]

The effects of piracy impact not only fishing fleets, but also economies dependent upon them. The small island nation of Seychelles has been particularly hard-hit. Lower catches can translate into lower licensing revenues. Lower catches also mean fewer calls to port, which impacts businesses servicing and provisioning fishing vessels. Reduced supply has driven raw material prices up, adversely impacting processing operations. The significance of these impacts cannot be understated given that approximately 40 percent of Seychellesí foreign earnings come from tuna and tuna related industries.[34]

In an unanticipated turn of events, piracy may have played a role in helping small pole and line fisheries based in the Maldives to achieve the ëFriends of the Seaí sustainable seafood eco-label.  Piracy induced catch reductions were critical in qualifying the fisheries, some of which are considered to be at maximum sustainable yield in normal fishing years. Friends of the Sea indicates that it will continue to closely monitor the ecological condition of the fishery and the status of the eco-label as conditions change over time.[35]

The implications of Indian Ocean piracy for the WCPO have so far not been articulated. However, continued interruptions in tuna supply from the Indian Ocean have the potential to increase tuna prices globally. If the Indian Ocean remains to dangerous for tuna fishing, vessels may seek to relocate to the WCPO, a move that would increase demand for licenses.

Exporting tuna to China

The seafood sector is keeping a close watch on China, looking for opportunities to access low cost processing facilities and the worldís largest consumer market. Opportunities and challenges abound for both prospects.

In recent years, Chinaís seafood processing sector has seen significant growth, as has seafood trade. In 2004, 12.9 million tons of seafood was processed in China, a 13 percent increase from 2003. In 2008, the seafood processing sector was worth USD5.7 billion and had averaged 4 percent annual growth from 2004 to 2008.[36] Forty percent of all seafood imports ñ supplied primarily by Russia and the United States ñ are for processing and re-export, mainly to the EU and the US.[37] Fish fillets are the highest volume, and value, of exports. Prepared or packaged fish products are also a significant proportion of export volume and value.

Pollock and shellfish are the products most commonly processed in China for re-export. However, there are opportunities for tuna processors looking for highly efficient, low-cost canning or filleting in China as well. European firms indicate that it is cheaper to send tuna to China, process it there, and have it sent back to the EU for consumption, even with high fuel costs. According to one industry representative, quality is good and Chinese firms are able to meet standards and comply with traceability requirements, making it worthwhile for European firms to, ëcircumvent [their] own processing industryí.[38] Other industry representatives indicated that early tuna canning efforts in China have been successful and that some factories are converting to full time tuna canning.[39] Re-export processing efforts are supported by a 100 percent tariff rebate, paid at the time of export.[40]

However, the promise of moving tuna processing to China is overshadowed by an array of concerns. In the global economic downturn, Chinaís manufacturing is downshifting and teetering on the brink of recession.[41] The Chinese government has implemented a range of measures to prop up production, including a USD585 billion plan aimed at revitalising core industries, including the food processing sector. Stricter inspection standards in export markets could cool demand for products processed in China, particularly in the wake of several recent food safety scandals. Furthermore, cold chain logistical problems in China result in massive product losses ñ an estimated USD9.3 billion, or 25-30 percent of total perishable product production, each year.[42]

Pacific island countries should remain aware of the potential shift to tuna processing in China and assess how such a change may influence their returns on tuna exports. Fresh chilled exporters should watch the market closely to determine how filleting and light processing in China might be either a threat or an opportunity.

In addition to efforts to increase tuna processing in China, exporters also seek access to Chinaís large consumer market. Already, Chinese consumers eat more seafood than the world average, and solid growth in consumption, particularly for high quality and high value varieties, is expected to continue as the middle class continues to grow.[43] Food safety scares have led consumers to shop less in small fish markets and more in supermarkets and megastores where quality is more tightly regulated. A restaurant culture in the big cities has also grown rapidly.[44]

Some Philippine firms indicate that they are exporting their frozen and canned tuna to Beijing and Shanghai and that they expect China to become an increasingly important market.[45] However, access to the Chinese market can not be taken as given. First, China is the leading producer of seafood in the world and is expected to be able to satisfy its own growing demand.[46] Second, potential exporters must identify target consumers and confirm appeal through market research before launching new products.[47] Furthermore, the cold chain problems that plague the processing sector (see above), and supply chain logistics more generally, also stand to create barriers to accessing the Chinese consumer market profitably.

For PIC tuna exporters, there is potential to better penetrate the Chinese consumer market, particularly for high-end sashimi-grade tuna in the main urban centers. Efforts to access the market must be carefully formulated and will require logistical support and strategic contacts in the marketplace.


Coming in the next issue (July 2009, Vol. 2: Issue 7)

* Update on tuna-related Free Trade Agreements
* Fisheries and Pacific island country food security
* Update on Greenpeace tuna campaigns

1 Prepared for the FFA Fisheries Development Division by Liam Campling, Consultant Fisheries Trade Analyst, FFA, and Elizabeth Havice, University of California-Berkeley. Desktop publishing by Antony Price. The authors would like to thank Amanda Hamilton for her input on an earlier draft of this briefing. The contents of this briefing (including all analysis and opinions) are the responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the positions or thinking of the FFA Secretariat or its Members.
2 DowJones Business News, ëPacific island nations seek more money from tuna licensesí, 30 January 2009. Available at: http://www.dj.com
3 For example, fisheries officials and industry representatives from Palau have begun to forge joint-venture fishing firms with industry from the Philippines. Romer S. Sariemento, ëPalau to explore tuna catching joint venturesí, Atuna, 8 January 2009. Available at: http://www.atuna.com
4 WCPFC, ëConservation and management measure for bigeye and yellowfin tuna in the Western and Central Pacific Oceaní, Conservation and Management Measure 2008-01. December 2008. Available at: http://www.wcpfc.int
5 Anouk Ride, ëOutcomes from PNA Official meetingí, FFA Press Release, 12 May 2009. Available at: http://www.ffa.int
6 Samisoni Pareti, ëCover Story: A tuna cartel? Pacific states borrow OPEC idea to fix tuna priceí, Islands Business, 8 June 2009. Available at: http://www.islandsbusiness.com
7 Anouk Ride, ëOutcomes from PNA Ministers meetingí, FFA Press Release, 19 May 2009. Available at: http://www.ffa.int 
8 ëThe ìTuna Cooperationî Worlds Largest Tuna Cartelí, Atuna, 18 June 2009. Available at: http://www.atuna.com
9 Samisoni Pareti (2009).
10 ëRegion on tuna pricesí, Fiji Broadcasting Corporation Limited, 3 June 2009. Available at: http://www.radiofiji.com.fj
11 ëInvestors visit Solomon Islands to discuss a potential tuna canneryí, Radio New Zealand, 16 January 2009; ëSolomons keen on attracting new tuna cannery investorsí, Radio New Zealand, 21 January 2009; ëInvestor expresses interest for new Solomon tuna canneryí, SIBC News, 15 January 2009.
12 ëNew Vanuatu plant starts shipments to Japaní, Radio New Zealand, 16 April 2009.
13 ëMajor tuna players partner in new PNG tuna plantí, Atuna, 9 February 2009. Available at: http://www.atuna.com; ëNew tuna processing facility in Lae, PNGí, FFA Fisheries Trade News, 2:2, February 2009. Available at: http://www.ffa.int
14 ëSpecial terms eyed for marine park investors in PNGí, The National/PACNEWS, 7 February 2009. Available at: http://www.pina. com.fj/?p= pacnews&m= read&o=128513771 74a4c20d9ebdfe07 55571
15 Pers. Communications with multiple industry representatives, government officials and civil society organisations, 2006-9.
16 See for example, Brenda Peter, ëRD Tuna Pollution Allegationsí, Post Courier, 3 June 2003; ëCannery ìGuiltyî of Pollutioní, Post Courier, 27 November 2003; ëStrike to Disrupt Tuna Productioní, Post Courier, 30 August 2004. Available at: http://www.postcourier.com.pg/
17 This story draws on the following sources: ëMexico requests WTO consultations with US in ongoing tuna disputeí, ICTSD Bridges Weekly Trade News Digest, 12: 36, 30 October 2008; ëTuna-dolphin bis?í, ICTSD Bridges Weekly Trade News Digest, 12: 5, November 2008; ëTuna-dolphin updateí, ICTSD News and Analysis, 13: 1, March 2009; ëDispute panel established in tuna-dolphin case, despite US objectionsí, ICTSD Trade BioRes, 9: 8, 1 May 2009; ëTuna-dolphin updateí, ICTSD News and Analysis, 13: 2, June 2009. Available at http://www.ictsd.org 
18 Thanks to Brian OíRiordan for comments on an earlier draft of this story.
19 ëBlood, Sweat and Takeaways - 1. Tunaí, BBC 3, 25th May 2009. Media reviews of the documentary are available here: Lucy Cavendish, ëBlood, Sweat And Takeaways: Fancy a tuna sandwich? You'll have to kill it firstí, Daily Mail, 15 May 2009:  http://www.dailymail.co.uk/femail/article-1181313/Blood-Sweat-And-Takeaw...
20 Information on fair trade is available at the Fairtrade Labelling Organizations International website, available here:  http://www.fairtrade.net/
21 Information on the UKís Ethical Trading Initiative is available here: http://www.ethicaltrade.org
22 A full database of ILO conventions is available here: http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/convdisp1.htm
23 For more information see: http://www.itfglobal.org/seafarers/index.cfm
24 ICSF has a website dedicated to labour standards in fishing: http://labour.icsf.net/icsf2006/jspFiles/labour/index.jsp
25 For an introduction to piracy in the Western Indian Ocean, see: ëPiracy and tuna fisheries in the Western Indian Oceaní, FFA Fisheries Trade News, 1:11, October 2008. Available at: http://www.ffa.int
26 Farid Omar, ëLondon ëmini-industryí is profiting from Somalia piracyí, Atuna, 17 February 2009. Available at: http://www.atuna.com
27 Y. Riva and M. Goujon, ëThe EU tropical tuna fleet and piracy in the Indian Oceaní, Presented at the 2nd European Tuna Conference, Brussels, 27 April 2009.
28 John Bowermaster, ëBreaking news: Pirates come to the Seychellesí, National Geographic Notes from Sea Level, 8 April 2009. Available at: http://www.nationalgeographic.com.
29 Riva and Goujon (2009); Taiwan News, ëHijacked Taiwan longliner on course from Seychelles to Somaliaí, Atuna, 15 April 20009. Available at: http://www.atuna.com
30 ëImpact of piracy on tuna boats affects catchesí, Australia TO, 7 April 2009.
31 ëSeychelles suffering from less tuna supply due to piratesí, BBC News, 23 January 2009. Available at: http://www.news.bbc.co.uk
32 Australia TO (2009).
33 Taiwan News, ëGroup opposes arming its tuna fishermen against piratesí, Atuna, 15 April 2009.
34 BBC News (2009).
35 ëMaldives hand and pole-line fisheries were recently certified by Friends of the Sea (FOS) eco-labelí, Friends of the Sea Press Release, 23 February 2009.
36 Ben DiPietro, ëReport: China seafood sector processing $6.7 billioní, IntraFish Media, 7 May 2009. Available at: http://www.intrafish.no
37 Glitnir, ëChina seafood industry reportí, November 2007.
38 Pers. Communication, EU industry representative, 2006.
39 Pers. Communication, International Tuna Specialists, 2006.
40 Glitner (2007).
41 United Press International, ëIs China in a recession?í, IntraFish Media, 5 January 2009. Available at: http://www.intrafish.no
42 Ben DiPietro (2009).
43 Glitner (2007).
44 Ben DiPietro, ëSelling seafood in China: Proceed with cautioní, IntraFish Media, 2 December 2008. Available at: http://www.intrafish.no
45 Xinhua News Agency, ëChina holds promise for Philippine tuna sectorí, IntraFish Media, 10 February 2009. Available at: http://www.intrafish.no
46 Glitner (2007).
47 DiPietro (2008).