FFA TRADE AND INDUSTRY NEWS Volume 9: Issue 3 May-June 2016

FFA TRADE AND INDUSTRY NEWS    Volume 9: Issue 3May-June 2016

By Elizabeth Havice, Mike McCoy, Liam Campling[1]



Special Feature   

14th Infofish World Tuna Trade Conference Summary

Fisheries Management

US and Pacific Island Parties Reach New US Treaty Agreement

US combines in-zone and high seas fishing effort in interim rule

Port State Measures Agreement Enters into Force

Tuna Industry

PNA and ISSF establish a formal framework for cooperation

Solomon Islands’ tuna fishery achieves MSC fisheries certification  

Thailand graduates to Tier 2, PNG drops to Tier 3 in US Trafficking in Persons Report



14th Infofish World Tuna Trade Conference Summary

The Fourteenth World Tuna Trade Conference & Exhibition was held in Bangkok from 23-25 May 2016. The ‘Tuna 2016’ conference was themed ‘Social Responsibility Towards Global Sustainability’ and consisted of 33 presentations delivered over three days, centred largely on the purse seine fishing sector and related canned tuna industry. Around 350-400 people attended which is lower than previous years, perhaps owing to the high cost of registration and/or numerous other tuna conferences held between the bi-annual Bangkok conference for the Pacific, Europe and Americas regions which cover similar topics. A summary of key points from the presentations follows.[2] 

Global Tuna Production: Global tuna production has trended upwards annually since the 1960s and has now reached around 5.8 million mt. Pew estimates that the end value of the seven most commercially important tuna species in 2014 (4.99 million mt) was US $42.2 billion. From 2010-2015, purse seine vessel numbers increased by over 130 vessels (mostly in the Western and Central Pacific region); the global longline fleet has also increased by 130-140 vessels. Tuna markets, particularly those for canning-grade raw material, are characterised by sharp raw material price fluctuations which impacts negatively on each segment of the tuna supply chain. Stronger coordination between regulators and industry is required to better control fishing effort and capacity to harmonise supply and demand and stabilise prices. By 2025, it is anticipated that new additions to the purse seine and longline fleet, together with catches from obsolete boats that opportunistically return to fishing when fishing conditions and/or prices are favourable, will bring global tuna production to around 6.9 million mt (around 20% growth). World population is also expected to grow by over 20% from 2015 to 2025 to 8.6 billion by 2015; it is anticipated that global tuna catches will continue to fall short of demand from the growing population (projected 7.8 million mt demand in 2025 vs. 6.9 million mt production). 

Tuna Fisheries Status & Management:  The Western and Central Pacific Ocean (WCPO) is the largest contributor to global tuna catches, with a record high catch of 2.88 million mt in 2014, valued at US$ 6.2 billion. The purse seine fishery accounts for almost 70% of catches; skipjack is the predominant species caught at 1.9 million mt.  Skipjack and albacore stocks remain healthy, while yellowfin is approaching full exploitation and bigeye is in an overfished state with overfishing occurring by longliners and purse seiners when fishing on fish aggregation devices (FADs). Purse seine fishing capacity continues to grow due to new vessel construction and technological advances; longline vessel numbers (and related capacity) fluctuate. One of the key fisheries management instruments in the WCPO is WCPFC’s conservation and management measure for tropical tunas (skipjack, yellowfin and bigeye) (CMM 2015-01). This measure was first introduced in 2004, largely to manage the purse seine and tropical longline fisheries and continues to evolve; WCPFC is also progressing a harvest strategy framework. Current regional management challenges include the development of a recovery plan for bigeye, reducing fishing capacity, provision of operational-level data by all fleets, multi-stakeholder tensions, eliminating IUU fishing and developing adaptive management against climate change.  The Parties to the Nauru Agreement (PNA), 8 Pacific Island countries accounting for over 2 million mt of WCPO purse seine catches, continue to implement their own management measures in addition to those adopted at the regional level through WCPFC.  In 2016, PNA will continue to progress fisheries management initiatives including FAD registration and tracking and introduction of a FAD charge per set, electronic monitoring and reporting, as well as implementation of a longline vessel day scheme. PNA remains strongly committed to its purse seine vessel day scheme, despite recent calls by some to move to a catch quota allocation system. 

Total tuna catch in the Eastern Pacific Ocean (EPO) was 690,000 mt in 2015, a 13% increase from 2014 (47% skipjack; 35% yellowfin). The majority of catch is caught by purse seiners and is supplied to processors in Ecuador (40-50%) and Mexico (~22%). EPO skipjack stocks remain healthy, while yellowfin is fully exploited and bigeye has recovered slightly from being overfished to being fully exploited. Like the WCPO, EPO’s purse seine fishing capacity continues to increase (now 25,000 m3), together with related FAD fishing activity. IATTC’s future management plans include integrating tagging data into stock assessments, investigating use of spatial closures to reduce bigeye catches and cooperating with WCPFC/SPC to conduct a Pacific-wide bigeye stock assessment. 

The Indian Ocean’s (IO) annual tuna catch is around 1.7-1.8 million mt and valued at approximately US $2 billion; tuna accounts for around 18% of total fisheries production.  Purse seining and gill netting are the most significant gear types accounting for 36% and 31% of tuna catches, respectively; smaller volumes are also caught by longliners (15%) and pole and liners (7%). The IO’s albacore, bigeye and skipjack stocks remain healthy, however striped marlin and very recently, yellowfin, have been declared overfished with overfishing occurring, with a reduction in fishing mortality of 20-30% required for these stocks to recover. Current management challenges include data deficiencies, misaligned regional and national research agendas and major differences in positions between coastal and distant water fishing states on quota allocation. 

Tuna Markets:  The EU and US, both traditional markets for canned tuna, continue to stagnate. The EU canned tuna market contracted by 5% in 2015 (although this reduction partially relates to an increase in cooked loin imports in place of finished goods). The US canned tuna market’s downward consumption trend also continues, with 2015 sales down by 2.7% on 2014, but it remains a globally significant market valued at US $1.6 billion. The US shelf-stable market continues to be dominated by the ‘big three’ brands – Starkist (40.5%), Bumble Bee (25.6%) and Chicken of the Sea (15.4%). The US market for fresh/frozen tuna showed increases in the total dollar value of sales of fresh (mostly sashimi) and frozen (mostly grilling grade) during the period 2012-2015. Still, fresh tuna represents only about 1.7% of the total dollar value of fresh seafood in the US (salmon is 30% and shrimp 18%) and about 1% for frozen tuna (shrimp 49%). The Japanese market for sashimi, katsuobushi and canned tuna remains the world’s largest single-country market for tuna, but has experienced an overall 25% decline in consumption from 1 million mt in 2005 to around 750,000mt in 2014; the sashimi market suffered the largest contraction from 636,000 mt to 464,000 mt (37%).  

Latin America accounts for 15% of global tuna consumption and has a favourable market outlook overall given its growing population, positive economic growth, rising standards of living and increasing per capita fish consumption. The ‘Pacific Alliance’ countries (Mexico, Colombia, Peru, Chile) will continue to be more relevant than the ‘Atlantic Mercosur’ (Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay) in terms of tuna production and consumption. Alternative markets in the Middle East and North Africa have growth potential with increases in tuna consumption in recent years to exceed 130,000mt (valued at over US $1 billion). The Middle East canned tuna market is centred on light meat and the largest consuming countries are Egypt, Libya and Saudi Arabia. 

Despite several countries being tuna processing ‘powerhouses’ (i.e. Thailand, Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia), consumer demand for tuna products in South East Asia remains relatively low. While China has doubled its exports of processed tuna (mostly cooked loins) since 2010, it remains a very minor market for canned tuna; however, the Chinese market for fresh and frozen tuna is growing as the expanding upper middle and affluent classes seek ‘luxury’ food choices (such as bluefin tuna) and China further develops its ultra-low temperature cold chain. There has been some Chinese and overseas investment (i.e. Thai Union, Dongwon) in Chinese tuna processing facilities in anticipation of future growth in domestic canned tuna consumption. 

IUU Fishing:  Since the introduction of the EU’s IUU Fishing Regulation in 2008, IUU fishing has become a key market-access related issue for the EU. Developing countries (as well as some developed countries) have experienced difficulties complying with the regulations’ requirements due to constraints such as inadequate legislation and sanctions to deter IUU fishing, limited technical capacity and human resources, limited budgets and difficulties monitoring and controlling vessels fishing vast distances. Several Pacific Island countries, as well as Thailand (and others) have been issued yellow card warnings. Sri Lanka was issued a red card and had its EU market access for fish and fish products suspended for failing to close out shortcomings in its implementation of the regulation, including inadequate control over 1,600 longliners operating in the Indian Ocean. During its market suspension, Sri Lanka’s seafood exports have declined by 35% with ten processing facilities going out of business and thousands of workers losing their jobs. Thailand is working hard to improve efforts to combat IUU fishing and close out its yellow card, with other South East Asian nations also following suit. 

Sustainability, Eco-labelling and Labour Issues:  NGOs continue to place significant pressure on major European brands regarding sustainability, particularly those that have failed to meet sustainable tuna sourcing commitments. European retailers (especially in the UK) are moving their private labels to ‘sustainable’ tuna and sourcing increasing volumes of pole and line, FAD-free and MSC certified products. It is anticipated that retailers will also place pressure on major national brands to follow suit. Retailers (such as Tesco) are increasingly looking to source tuna from fisheries with healthy tuna stocks, minimal environmental impact, effective management and compliance, robust traceability and fair treatment of workers. One speaker forecasted that ‘sustainable tuna’ (i.e. MSC/P&L) will be sold at more affordable prices in future and increasingly ‘unsustainable’ tuna products will lose shelf space and/or be priced higher than ‘sustainable’ tuna under the ‘polluter pays’ principle. 

To date, market penetration of independent eco-labels such as Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) remains quite limited for the tuna sector in the EU (and other developed markets), but is anticipated to grow. MSC now has nine certified tuna fisheries (~850,000mt) and seven in assessments (~235,000mt) for skipjack, yellowfin and albacore across all four oceans, representing over 20% of global tuna production. Growth in MSC-certified tuna is outpacing growth overall of MSC production. In response to market confusion surrounding various seafood eco-labelling schemes, the Global Sustainable Seafood Initiative (GSSI) has developed a benchmarking tool to rank seafood certification schemes and identify the strongest. 

‘Sustainability’ encompasses environmental, social and economic pillars. To date, the global tuna industry’s focus has been largely on the environmental pillar, but attention is increasingly turning to social accountability, with labour issues in fishing and fish processing sectors becoming more prominent. Thailand’s fishing and seafood processing sectors have recently been under fire for labour rights abuses and human trafficking. Effectively addressing labour issues will require improved working conditions at sea and in onshore facilities, strengthened legislation and enforcement, as well as effective mechanisms for redress, as well as industry commitment to comply with labour standards. 



US and Pacific Island Parties Reach New US Treaty Agreement

After the tie-up then re-entry of the US fleet into Pacific Island Party (PIP) waters and US government announcement of the end of the US Treaty in early 2016, PIPs, US government and US industry have negotiated a new structure for the Treaty beyond 2016. Negotiation focused on the forms that regulation, ownership and access rights will take in the future of the purse seine fishery. 

A working group of the Pacific Island Parties met with the US to develop options for a possible structure for the future of the Treaty, with FFA Director General James Movick reporting that the working group develop several options for the Treaty that left him hopeful that there would be a proposed treaty in place by July.[3] Indeed, US-PIP negotiations in Auckland in late June yielded the survival of the US Treaty under a new structure.[4] Specifics on the exact makeup of the deal, such as total value and number of days, had not been disclosed at the time of print, but US and Pacific officials reported an extended deal that is of interest to both sides. The new deal focuses on access and fees. Reported features of the agreement include:[5]

* Amount of days and price set for the first four years of the new agreement, following which, terms will be revisited.

* The US fleet will have fewer overall days in the access package than in the prior interim agreement and access only to those zones in which they need to fish rather than across the entire region. 

* The US fleet will have a first right of refusal for a number of fishing days and new flexibility to compete in the market place with other vessel owners.

* Total deal value of up to approximately US$70 million/year if the fleet takes up all of its available opportunities and an average price on a fishing day of over US$ 14,000 in addition to the economic assistance from the US State Department.

* Provisions to encourage exploratory fishing in Pacific island waters where the purse seine fishery has not yet developed.

* US government contribution remaining at US$ 21 million per year through the life of the deal.

PIP officials indicate that the new Treaty will continue to be of high importance in the Pacific because of the income that it offers to Pacific Island nations and the opportunity it presents for cooperative relations on broader matters. According to FFA Director General James Movick, “We have struck a six year deal that should provide for a secure yet flexible future for the US industry, stability in the delivery of US economic assistance and excellent financial returns to the Pacific Islands”.[6] For its part, US industry, represented by the American Tunaboat Association, reports hope that the new structure will provide a viable future for the US fleet in the region.[7] Both Pacific and US governments will still have to confirm the agreement - endorsement by FFA Fisheries Ministers, and approval by the US Secretary of State to withdraw notification of intent to terminate the agreement.


US combines in-zone and high seas fishing effort in interim rule

WCPFC CMM 2015-01 requires that WCPFC members limit fishing effort by purse seine vessels in certain areas of the Convention Area including relevant provisions for the US EEZ and US fishing vessels on the high seas. Since 2009, the US has regularly notified the WCPFC of its purse seine effort in the US EEZ at 558 fishing days per year, which under CMM 2015-01 is the limit that is applicable from 2016 through 2017. CMM 2015-01 provides that the US purse seine fishing effort on the high seas in 2016 be limited to 1,270 fishing days. In an interim rule, the US has specified that ‘as in previous rules to implement similar Commission-mandate limits on purse seine fishing effort, this interim rule continues to implement the applicable limits for the US EEZ and the high seas such that they apply to a single area, without regard to the boundary between the US EEZ and the high seas’.[8]  The justification provided is that CMM 2015-01 has separate provisions for the high seas and EEZ ‘merely because they are subject to different management responsibility, and not because of different conservation and management needs or objectives for the two areas’.[9] The interim rule specifies that after considering management of two separate areas versus a combine area, NMFS selected the combined area because the approach ‘is expected to result in greater operational flexibility to affected purse seine vessels and lesser adverse economic impacts’. The rules results in 1,828 fishing days for the US purse seine fleet that can be taken anywhere in the ‘Effort Limit Area for Purse Seine’ (ELAPS), or the area that combines the US EEZ and the high seas.

The interim rule was issued without prior notice or public comment because of the unexpectedly high level of US purse seine fishing in the ELAPS in 2016 following the halt on US Treaty licenses at the start of the year. The fleet, to offset loss of access to the PIP waters, concentrated fishing effort during the first two months of 2016 in small pocket areas of the ELPAS that are not part of the Treaty Licensing Area and do not require Treaty licenses to fish. To satisfy WCPFC obligations, NMFS is required to establish applicable limits for 2016 before they are exceeded, which, based on preliminarily NMFS data, were expected to occur as early as June 2016, which would come before a public comment period would close. 

The PNA did not respond favourably to this announcement, suggesting the regulation attempted to evade the regional WCPFC conversation measure as well as to evade the PNA’s Vessel Day Scheme by fishing outside of Pacific island nations’ waters. Outgoing PNA CEO Dr. Transform Aqorau suggested that it is unacceptable for the US government or any flag state to unilaterally increase its fishing day limit on the high seas above WCPFC limits.[10]


Port State Measures Agreement Enters into Force

In 2009, the FAO Conference on Fisheries adopted the Port State Measures Agreement (PSMA)[11] and opened it for signature. The binding agreement requires those countries covered by the Agreement once it enters into force to adopt at least minimum port state measure identified in the Agreement. Those measures are intended to block the entry from ports of IUU-caught fish into national and international markets. Such measures are intended to cover foreign vessels that seek port entry for landing, transshipping, packaging and processing of fish that have not been previously landed, as well as entry for other port services such as refueling, resupplying, maintenance, and dry-docking.  

The Agreement’s provisions enable it to enter into force 30 days after the date of deposit with FAO of the 25th instrument of ratification, acceptance approval or accession. According to FAO, this number was reached on May 6, 2016 and the Agreement thus entered into force on June 5, 2016. The Pacific Island countries approving the agreement and which are now obligated to comply with its provisions are Palau, Tonga, and Vanuatu.[12] 

Although none of the three Pacific Island countries mentioned above currently contain major landing ports, the USA ratification of the PSMA on February 26, 2016 covers American Samoa (as well as Guam and other US territories). The PSMA and its parallel provisions in US law do not apply to other US ports, since other provisions of US law prohibit foreign-flagged vessels from unloading fish or fisheries products in U.S. ports.

NOAA’s Office of Law Enforcement plans to use the enhanced information available under the PSMA and expects that it will  “significantly enhance the ability to prioritize vessel inspections related to the vessel and catch onboard”, and that “Expanded, thorough inspections (rather than focused “spot checks”)  will become more routine.[13] In practical terms, and given those countries currently covered by the PSMA, it appears that IUU detection by the U.S. in American Samoa will be enhanced primarily by Korean and Vanuatu sources, both countries having approved the Agreement.14 



PNA and ISSF establish a formal framework for cooperation

On 5 May, the Parties to the Nauru Agreement (PNA) and the International Seafood Sustainability Foundation (ISSF) announced that they have signed a three-year Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) which establishes a framework for mutual cooperation between the two organisations.[15]  Founded in 2009, ISSF is a collaboration between scientists, industry and environmental NGOs with a mission ‘to undertake and facilitate science-based initiatives for the long-term conservation and sustainable use of global tuna stocks, reducing bycatch and promoting tuna ecosystem health.’[16] 

This marks a positive step forward for PNA and ISSF, whose relationship in the past has been strained after ISSF lodged a formal objection to PNA’s MSC fisheries certification for their purse seine fishery in 2011. Under the MOU, PNA and ISSF have undertaken to work jointly on activities such improved and expanded use of e-monitoring and e-reporting technologies, implementation of a harvest strategy and a regional capacity management mechanism, as well as other science-based activities.  

Following the signing of the MOU, ISSF granted an exemption to newly constructed purse seiners flagged by PNA members to its capacity measure prohibiting ISSF participating members from purchasing tuna from fishing vessels not actively fishing or under contract for construction by 31 December 2012. Previously, PNA members have been critical of ISSF’s failure in its capacity measure to recognise the legitimate rights and aspirations of small island developing states (SIDS) to develop their domestic tuna fisheries. Unlike WCPFC’s purse seine capacity management measure (CMM 2015-01, paras. 49 & 50) which permits SIDS (and Indonesia) to construct new purse seine vessels without being required to scrap existing equivalent capacity from the fishery, ISSF’s capacity resolution previously applied to all large-scale purse seiners regardless of flag. This would have prevented PNA-flagged fishing vessels constructed outside of ISSF’s deadlines from selling fish to traders and tuna processors who are ISSF members.[17] ISSF has established a number of conditions which must be met for the exemption to apply to newly constructed vessels under PNA members’ flags. Vessels must be on WCPFC’s record of authorized fishing vessels and ISSF’s ProActive Vessel Register (PVR), operate under the PNA’s Purse Seine Vessel Day Scheme and fish exclusively within the WCPFC Convention Area. In addition, if ISSF participating companies (or their majority shareholders) are investors in new PNA-flagged purse seiners, they must buy out and scrap existing capacity in the fishery up to their percentage ownership of capacity in the new vessel.[18] Unfortunately, this requirement does not prevent non-ISSF related distant water fishing companies from opportunistically entering into joint ventures with PNA members to circumvent WCPFC and ISSF’s capacity measures, but goes some way towards closing a potential loop hole.  


Solomon Islands’ tuna fishery achieves MSC fisheries certification  

The Solomon Islands skipjack and yellowfin purse seine and pole and line fishery has achieved Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) certification, following a public announcement made by MSC and posting of the public certification report to MSC’s website. The MSC fisheries certification covers five purse seiners and three pole and line vessels owned by National Fisheries Developments Ltd. (a Tri Marine subsidiary) fishing within Solomon Islands archipelagic waters and the EEZ. Around 25,000mt-30,000mt/year of the fleet’s free-school, anchored FAD and pole and line skipjack and yellowfin catches could potentially qualify as MSC-certified, the majority of which is delivered to Solomon Island’s Noro-based tuna processing facility, Soltuna.[19] Currently, Soltuna supplies canned tuna locally and to other Pacific Island markets, as well as frozen cooked loins to Europe. NFD and Soltuna are locally managed and collectively employ over 2,000 Solomon Islanders, representing one of the country’s largest private sector employers.[20]  

This marks the second successful MSC fisheries certification for Tri Marine (last month Tri Marine’s US purse seine fleet gained MSC certification for free-school skipjack and yellowfin sets for selected fishing grounds within the WCPO) and also the second MSC certification for a tuna fishery that has not received any formal objections and proceeded to independent adjudication; all other previous MSC tuna fishery assessments required an independent adjudicators ruling on whether the fishery could be MSC certified or not. Now, five WCPO tuna fisheries are MSC-certified – two longline albacore fisheries (Fiji, Cook Islands) and three purse seine fisheries (PNA, Tri Marine, Solomon Islands). These fisheries are in an advantageous position to respond to growing demand for certified sustainable sources of tuna.   


Thailand graduates to Tier 2, PNG drops to Tier 3 in US Trafficking in Persons Report

Following two years running at the lowest rank in the US’ Trafficking in Persons (TIP) report (Tier 3) the US Department of State has upgraded Thailand to the Tier 2 ‘Watch List’ given its significant improvement in efforts to comply with the US’ minimum standards of human trafficking, despite still not meeting minimum standards. The US’ annual TIP report ranks countries into tiers according to human trafficking records – Tier 1 nations meet minimum US standards; Tier 2 are making significant efforts to meet the standards; Tier 2 Watch List are countries requiring special scrutiny; and Tier 3 are countries that are deemed to not be making significant efforts to meet the minimum standards. In 2014, Thailand was downgraded from Tier 2 to Tier 3 following widespread allegations of human trafficking and forced labour violations in its commercial fishing and seafood processing sectors, amongst others. The Thai Government has made considerable efforts over the past two years to address trafficking issues, including revisions to fisheries and anti-trafficking legislation which strengthens penalties for traffickers and government officials complicit in trafficking crimes, enables the closure of businesses involved in forced labour and protects persons who report incidences of human trafficking.[21] In association with efforts to combat IUU fishing, the Thai Government has established a dedicated command centre and 28 port in-port out centres that perform inspections to ensure vessels are operating legally and are not involved in human trafficking and forced labour. To avoid dropping back to Tier 3 again, Thailand will need to continue to make progress in reducing widespread forced labour in the seafood sector which is reportedly continuing to occur.[22]  

After just one year on the Tier 2 Watch List, PNG has dropped back to a Tier 3 ranking.  The State Department reports that foreign and local men are subjected to forced labour of fishing vessels operating in PNG’s EEZ, amongst other violations. TIP reported that PNG authorities failed to prosecute on any trafficking offences or convict any traffickers, nor did they provide financial or in-kind support for protective services.  PNG also failed to approve and implement a national action plan for human trafficking. Tier 3-rated countries like PNG risk aid or trade-related sanctions being placed on them by the US Government.[23] 



1 Prepared for the FFA Fisheries Development Division by Dr Liam Campling, School of Business and Management, Queen Mary University of London, Dr Elizabeth Havice, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and Mike McCoy, independent consultant, all Consultant Fisheries Trade and Market Intelligence Analysts, Fisheries Development Division, FFA. Desktop publishing by Antony Price. The authors would like to thank Mike Batty for his input on an earlier draft of this briefing. The contents of this briefing (including all analysis and opinions) are the responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the positions or thinking of the FFA Secretariat or its Members.

2 This article summarizes key points from numerous presentations delivered during the 14th Infofish World Tuna Trade Conference. The programme and list of presenters is available at: www.infofish.org. Individual presentations can be sourced directly from the Infofish Secretariat. 

3 ‘FFA ponders option for a new US tuna treaty’, Radio New Zealand, 24 March 2016. Available at: http://www.radionz.co.nz 

4 ‘US & Pacific reach new Treaty Agreement’, Atuna, 27 June 2016. Available at: http://www.atuna.com 

5 ‘Smiles for US Treaty as Pacific reaches six-year deal: Major breakthrough for Pacific Island Parties, US’, FFA Press Release, 27 June 2016. Available at: http://www.ffa.int; ‘US & Pacific reach new Treaty Agreement’, Atuna, 27 June 2016. Available at: http://www.atuna.com

6 ibid 

7 ‘US & Pacific reach new Treaty Agreement’, Atuna, 27 June 2016. Available at: http://www.atuna.com

8 ‘International Fisheries: Western and Central Pacific Fisheries for Highly Migratory Species; Fishing Effort Limits in Purse Seine Fisheries for 2016’, NOAA-NMFS-2016-0038-0001, Interim Rule, Effective on May 25 2016. Available at: http://www.regulations.gov 

9 ibid

10 ‘New US fishing rule attempts to evade regional conservation measure’, PNA Press Release, 12 June 2016. Available at: http:///www.pnatuna.com

11 Formally, the Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter, and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing.

12 Australia and New Zealand have both ratified the Agreement; Samoa signed in 2009 but has not taken further action. No other Pacific Island country has signed, ratified or otherwise approved the Agreement.

13 ‘Implementing the Port State Measures Agreement’, NOAA Fisheries , available at: http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/ole/about/implementing_psma_faq.html

14 China and Japan have not signed, ratified or otherwise approved the PSMA. Taiwan is not a member of FAO and is ineligible to accede to the Agreement. 

15 ‘ISSF and PNA establish framework for cooperation to achieve mutual sustainability goals’, ISSF, 5 May 2016.  Available at: http://www.iss-foundation.org

16 ISSF website 2016: http://www.iss-foundation.org

17 ‘PNA-ISSF cooperation hailed for domestic development operations’, PNA, 18 June 2016. Available at: http://www.pnatuna.com

18 op.cit. ISSF, 5 May 2016. 

19 MRAG Americas, MSC Final Report and Determination for Solomon Islands Skipjack and Yellowfin Tuna Purse Seine Anchored FAD, Purse Seine Unassociated and Pole and Line, May 2016. Available at: http://www.msc.org

20 ‘Solomon Islands skipjack and yellowfin achieves MSC certification’, Marine Stewardship Council, 12 July 2016.  Available at: http://www.msc.org

21 US Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report, June 2016.  Available at: http://www.state.gov

22 Ross Davies, ‘Thailand Bumped up to Tier 2 on TIP report; PNG, Myanmar downgraded’, Undercurrent News, 30 June 2016.  Available at: http://www.undercurrentnews.com

23 op.cit. US Department of State.